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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
et al., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
COMMISSION OF FINANCE, et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 7785 
The questions raised in this proceeding seem to re-
quire a judicial clarification of certain important consti-
tutional provisions involving the Board of Examiners, 
the Finance Commission, the State Board of Education, 
and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
The authors of this brief have no official connection 
with any agency of the state government. They have 
accepted this assignment in the hope that they may be 
of some aid to the court in arriving at a correet solution 
of the problems involved. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
PoiNT I. 
BATEMAN STILL OCCUPIES OFFICE TO WHICH HE 
WAS ELECTED. 
PoiNT II. 
OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTR.UC-
TION AND STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ABOLISHED. 
PoiNT III. 
CHAPTER 16, FIRST SPECIAL SESSION 1951, UNCON-
.. STITUTIONAL. 
PoiNT IV. 
OFFICES ON BOARD OF EDUCATION VACANT. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
BATEMAN STILL OCCUPIES OFFICE TO WHICH HE 
WAS ELECTED. 
Our research has brought us into agreement with 
the Attorney General upon certain important points. It 
is our purpose, therefore, to first state the extent of our 
agreement, and thereafter set forth the points upon which 
we disagree, with the reasons therefor. 
The power and authority of the Board of Examine-rs 
springs directly from the Constitution. The p·o:wer and 
authority of the Finance c·ommission arises from legis-
lative enactment. We are in agreement with the At-
torney General that any conflict between the two agencies 
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must be resolved in favor of the Board of Exruniners. 
The Finance Coininission 'Yas created to protect the tax-
payers fro1n the improvident or unlawful expenditure 
of public funds, but it is subordinate to the Board of 
Examiners. This does not mean that the Board of Ex-
aminers is above or beyond lawful restraint. It cannot 
make lawful a claim against the state if the· claim is in 
fact not a lawful claim. 
A State Board of Education lawfully constituted 
and validly subsisting may, at the proper ti1ne, appoint 
a State Superintendent of Public Instruction and fix 
his salary, subject to the approval of the Board of Ex-
aminers. We feel forced to the conclusion that an ap-
proval by the Board of Examiners could not be vetoed 
by the Finance Commission. 
So far 've have been in at least qualified agreement 
with the Attorney General, but we find ourselves in dis-
agreement with some of his premises, and with his final 
conclusions. 
Under Point I, at page 10 of his brief, the Attorney 
General says : 
"S-uperintendent Bateman's te-rm wa:s shorten-
ed, but the office was not abolished and no vacancy 
was created. 
"The offices of members of the Board were 
not abolished and no vacancies we-re created." 
Therein lies the point of our departure. The lan-
guage just quoted states the Attorney Gene.ral's funda-
mental premise. We disagree with the premise and the 
conclusions drawn from it. 
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The two amendments discussed by the Attorney 
General were both adopted by the people on November 
5, 1950. They expressed the solemn judgment of the 
people. They relate to a single subject and embrace a 
single plan and purpose. Whether this court shall fol-
low and apply that line of cases which hold that the 
effective date of a constitutional amendment may be sus-
pended for a reasonable time pending the enactment of 
implementing legislation or the line of cases which hold 
that in the absence of expressed conditions or reserva-
tions an amendment becomes immediately effective upon 
its adoption, this court cannot approve the conclusion 
advocated by the Attorney General without defeating and 
frustrating the expressed purpose and intention of the 
electorate. 
Previously, the management of the public school 
system was vested in an elective Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and an appointive Board of Education. On 
November 5, 1950, the people expressed their determina-
tion that the management of the public schoo1 system 
should reside in an elective Board of Education and an 
appointive superintendent. It is respectfully suggested 
that there is no room for any inference that the electorate 
intended that after November 5th, 1950, the legislature 
should, for a long p·eriod of years, t_ake to itself the 
management of the public S'choo[ system by unduly pro .. 
longing the life and functions of the old hoard or by as-
suming to app·oint the members of the newly created elec-
tive Board of Education. 
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The legislature has apparently assun1ed that the will 
of the electorate, as expressed in the amendment to 
Article X, Section 8, can be held in suspense and success-
fully th,varted until such time as it sees fit to give it ef-
fect. It has further assumed that in the meantime it can 
la,vfully detern1ine who shall occupy offices upon the 
Board of Education and for ho"\v long they may hold such 
offices. It has further assumed that such a board may 
appoint a superintendent and otherwise function without 
early or timely interference by the electorate or any other 
agency of government. 
The Attorney General supports his contention by 
cases which hold, in general effect, that when a constitu-
tional amendment altering the structure of government 
requires legislative implementation before the amend-
ment can become functional the status quo shall obtain 
until the new constitutional provision is made e.ffective 
by legislative implementation: State ex rel Richard-son 
v. Ewing, 17 Mo. 515; State ex rel Hudd v. Timme Secre-
tary of State (Wis.) 11 N.W. 785; State v. Scott, 9 Ark. 
270; Opinion of Justices, 3 Gray 601 (Mass.). To the 
same effect see: Broadwa.ter v. Kendig, et al., 261 P. 264 
(Mont.); Andrews v. Neil, et al., 120 P. 383 (Ore.); 
Hawley v. Anderson, et al., 190 P. 1097 (Ore.). 
The statement that the office to which Mr. Bateman 
was elected was not abolished and no vacancy therein 
was created by adoption of the constitutional amendment 
is just another way of stating that the office to which 
Mr. Bateman was elected survived the adoption of the 
amendment, and that Mr. Bateman is still the incumbent. 
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If the office to which Bateman was elected was not abol-
ished by the mere adoption of the constitutional ainend-
ment, then it survived at least until August 15, 1951. 
If it survived, and if no vacancy in the office was created 
by the adoption of the amendment, it is because Bateman 
still occupies the office. If the act of the legislature 
(Chapter 16, First Special Session Laws 1951) accom-
plished the implementation of the: constitutional amend-
rnents, it te-rminated, as of August 15, 19'51, both the 
office to which Bateman was elected and the offices on 
the Board of Education to which the o~ld appointive me.m-
bers had been appointed. Chapter 16, F'irst Special Ses-
sion was enacted and approved May 15, 1951, and be-
came effeetive. August 15th. 
Some of the cases cited and relied upon by the At-
torney General, as well as those cited by us above, would 
support the view that the amendments were not intended 
to alter the status quo until sufficiently implemented by 
legislation to make them operative, within the general 
fra1nework of the state government. Until that time, 
however, according to some cases, the office to which 
Bateman was elected survived and he continued to be the 
incumbent. As such incumbent he would be entitled to 
only the powers of the office to which he was elected, 
and to the, emoluments thereof as fixed by law at the 
time he sought and was elected to the, office. Such must 
be the result pending the falling in of the effective date 
of the constitutional amendments if the cases relied upon 
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by the .. A.ttorney General are to be follo,ved. Baten1an's 
terin 'Yas shortened only if his office ceased to exist. 
It will doubtless be asserted that the effective date 
of the runendment to Article X, Section 8, was held in 
suspension pending the legislature's leisurely enactment 
of in1plen1enting legislation, "\vhile the arnendment to 
Article \TIII, Section 1, conveniently took effect on J anu-
ary 1, 1951. Such a contention 'vill be in direct conflict 
"Tith the Attorney General's. statement on page· 10 of his 
brief that Batema11's office was not abolished and no 
vacancy therein 'vas created. Furthermore, it represents 
a unwarranted division into two parts of a single plan 
and purpose expressed by the electorate 'vhen it adopted 
the two amendments. Such a construction would require 
us to conclude that the people, having given up the. right 
to elect a State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
and at the same time having reclaimed the right to elect a 
State Board of Education, surrendered its purpose to 
the whims of the legislature by leaving the legislature 
free to control the Board of Education and thereby 
bring about the appointment of a Superintendent of 
Public Instruction in direct conflict with the expressed 
purpose of the voters. 
If the foregoing analysis should appeal to the court 
as sound and supported by re·spectable authority, the 
court will rule that if Bateman now lawfully occupies the 
office of superintendent it is the office to which he was 
elected, and he is entitled to only the emoluments of 
that office, which amount to $6,000.00 per year. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
PoiNT II. 
OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUC-
TION AND STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ABOLISHED. 
There is an alternative which we desire to submit 
for the serious consideration of the court. If the office 
to which Bateman was elected still exists and is not va-
cant, then Bateman is the incun1bent by force of his elec-
tion, and he cannot be appointed to an office which he 
already occupies by election. He can be appointed to fill 
ali office only if such office is vacant. 
Both constitutional amendments were adopted by 
the people on November 5, 1950. The one substituting 
an appointive Superintendent of Public Instruction for 
an elective state office became effective by its terms on 
January 1, 1951, the one substituting an elective State 
Board of Education for the old appointive board became 
effective on No;vemher 5, 1950. If at any time after Janu-
ary 1, 1951, Bateman became detached from the office 
to which he was elected, with its advantages and dis-
advantages to him, then it must be so because the adop-
tion of the amendment abolished the office to which he 
was elected .. The-re cannot be two offices of State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction in e·xistence at the same 
time: ( 1) the office to which Bateman was elected, and 
(2) the one created by the· amendment. The Attorney 
General is forced to detach Bateman from the office to 
which he was elected and get him into a new one in order 
to save for him the new salary attempted to be voted by 
the purported State Board of Education. 
If the constitutional amendment brought to an end 
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the office to 'vhich Bate1nan 'vas elected, then Bateman 
was no longer an incumbent of that office. Likewise, if 
the constitutional amendment brought an end to Bate-
Inan's office, it brought an end to the offices to which the 
old 1nembers of the old Board of Education were ap-
pointed. By adoption of the amendment on November 
5, 1950, the people abolished the old Board of Education 
and substituted a new board in its place, the offices per-
taining to which will remain vacant until filled as pro-
vided by law. The Constitution provides means to pre-
vent any interregnum. We desire to press this point 
further, but will diverge briefly to expose an incidental 
but significant point. 
The Attorney General devotes one section of his 
brief to the argument that the provision of Chapter 16, 
Section 2, First Special Session 1951, (75-7-1.50) provid-
ing for the election of one member of the State Board of 
Education in November, 1951, should be ignored upon 
the ground that the entire provision was enacted through 
carelessness and inadvertence upon the part of the legis-
lature. This would be our first experience in seeing the 
effect of a statute avoided upon the .ground that the 
legislature not only did not mean what it said, but did not 
mean to say anything upon the su·bject. The chapter 
under discussion does impress us as an example of bad 
draftsmanship, and the Attorney General could be right 
in inviting the radical judicial treatment which he urges. 
His reasoning is persuasive and is sup·ported by au-
thority. Bad legislative practices may not, however, 
justify the warping or abridging of constituitional pro-
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VISions. Whether an election of one board member should 
have been held in 1951, and the effect of such failure upon 
the competency of the board as such to function, raise 
some interesting abstract questions which we forego the 
pursuit of to avoid obscuring other points of greater 
significance. It may be that a State Board of Education, 
otherwise validly subsisting after N ovemher, 1951, might 
not have a valid existence in the absence of one elected 
member. 
The constitutional amendment which teTminated the 
existence of the old appointive board, and substituted 
in its place an elective board, had its origin in a joint 
resolution of the two Houses in 1949. Session Laws 1949, 
p. 296. The amendment as adopted was written by the 
legislature. The· legislature in drafting the amendment 
could have made provisions for susp,ension of the effec-
tive date of the amendment until implementing legisla-
tion could make it functional. The legislature failed to so 
provide. 
Not having done so, the amendment which it pro--
posed became effective immediately upon its adoption. 
See the instructive, -opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in 
United States of America v. Chambers, et al., 291 U.S. 
216, 78 L. Ed. 763, wherein these statements appear: 
"* * * Upon the ratification of the Twenty-
first Amendment, the Eighteenth Amendment at 
once beeame inoperative. Neither the Congress 
nor the court could give it continued vitality. The 
National Prohibition Act, to the extent that its 
provisions rested upon the grant of authority to 
the c·ongress by the Eighteenth Amendment, im-
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1nediately fell \Yith the "Tithdra,val by the- p·eople 
of the essential constitutional support." 
Further on, the Chief Justice says: 
··* * * The Congress, while it could propose, 
could not adopt the constitutional Amendment or 
vary the terms or effect of the Amendment when 
adopted. The T\venty-first Amendment contained 
no saving clause as to prosecutions for offenses 
theretofore committed. The Congress might have 
proposed the Amendment with such a saving 
clause, but it did not. 
And again the Chief Justice said: 
"* * * The principle involved is thus not 
archaic but rather is continuing and vital,-that 
the people are free to withdraw the authority they 
have conferred and, when withdrawn, neither the 
Congress nor the courts can assume the right to 
continue to exercise it." 
To the same effect se€ State v. Anderson, et al., 166 Atl. 
662, 664 (Del.) . 
PorNT III. 
CHAPTER 16, FIRST SPECIAL SESSION 1951, UNCON-
STITUTIONAL. 
During the regular session of 1951, the legislature 
failed to enact any implementing legislation. Not until 
the special session of 1951 did the legislature get around 
to the passage of any law upon the subject. Not only 
does the bill as finally enacted merit the criticism of 
carelessness, leveled at it by the Attorney General, it is 
subject to serious, and, we urge, fatal constitutional ob-
jections. We humbly suggest that the legislation was 
bad and should have been vetoed by the· GoiVernor. 
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By the two amendments of 1950 the people sur-
rendered the right to elect a State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, but took back to themselves the right 
to elect the members of the State Board of Education. 
The right to elect is certainly one of the fundamental 
rights of citizenship. Such rights cannot be unreasonably 
. suspended, or the exercise thereof long delayed by the 
legislature. 
Article I, Section 17, Constitution of Utah: 
"All elections shall be free, and no power, 
civil or military, shall at any time interfere to 
prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage. 
Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their post 
of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations 
to be prescribed by law." (Italics ours.) 
The 1951 legislature should have promptly provided 
for an election forthwith of the entire Board of Educa-
tion. It could have pro:vided for different tenures for 
the several members so that in the future the· entire mem-
bership would not be subject to change~ at any one elec-
tion. In such manner the dete.rmination of the people to 
elect the Board of Education would not have been de-
feated by unreasonable delay and suspension. What the 
legislature did was quite different. Under the provisions 
of Chapter 16, First Special S.ession, 1951, the electo-
rate will not have a chance to fill the Board of Education 
by elected officers until January of 1957-seven years 
and two months after the adoption of the amendment. 
( Ch. 16, First S·pecial Session, 1951, Sec. 75-7-1.50.) 
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If there was an unoccupied office to which Baten1an 
was eligible for appointment in 1951, it was because his 
old office was gone and he therefore no longer occupied 
it. If such were the case then the old offices of State 
Board of Education were gone. New offices existed, 
but they were vacant. The legislature cannot continue 
in existence an office terminated by the Constitution. 
People ex rel. Bledsoe v. Campbell, et a.l., 70 P. 918 (Cal.). 
In that case the California Supreme Court said: 
•'* * * But when the term of office is fixed 
by the constitution in definite and precise lan-
guage, as it is in the case of judges of the· sup·erior 
court, it is not competent for the le:gislature! to ex-
tend that term." 
Scott et al. v. Singleton, et al., 188 S.W. 302 (Ky.). 
In that case the Kentucky c·ourt of App·eals said: 
"* * * The General Assembly therefore had 
the power to prescribe the qualifications and fix 
the manner in which the· vacancies should be 
filled, but did not have the power to extend the 
length of time the appointe·es should hold office 
beyond the time fixed by section 152 of the Consti-
tution * * * ." 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 171 N.E. 237 (Mass.), 
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
said: 
"* * * The tenure of office of judges as thus 
settled by the Constitution is imperative and final. 
It cannot be enlarged, limited, modified, altered 
or in any way affected by the General Court." 
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Byrne & Speed Coal Co. v. City of Louisville, 224 
S.W. 883 (Ky.), wherein it is stated: 
"This rule, however, cannot be applied to 
me1nbers of the Legislature or members of legis-
lative municipal boards such as city councils, be-
cause the Constitution has in effect and by clear 
implication prescribed the terms of members of 
the General Asse.mbly and city councils, and it 
would not be competent for the Legislature to 
extend their terms by providing that they should 
hold over until their successors were elected and 
qualified or beyond the te-rm fixed in the Consti-
tution." 
Neither can the legislature, by appointment, fill va-
cancies in state offices. 
Board of Elections for Franklin County, et al. v. 
State ex rel. Schneider, 191 N.E. 115 (Ohio): 
"In this holding we are not denying any right 
to the General Assembly to extend the term of 
county recorder to four years, the maximum fixed 
by the Constitution. But all this can be done 
without extending the terms of incumbents for full 
two years. Nor are we condemning reasonable 
extensions of terms of office to meet constitutional 
requirements. We· do hold that, under its consti-
tutional grant of power, the General Assembly 
cannot present to an incumbent an extra term of 
office." 
S.ee also Sta.te v. High, 130 P. 611 (Ariz.) 
The point for which we here contend finds support 
by clear implication in the opinion of this court in Snow 
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v Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P. (2d) 234, wherein it 
is said at page 339 : 
••* * * The vice of extending a te.rm is tha.t it 
denies the people a chance to select the officer 
at the time he should be voted for, but in this case, 
if there has been a postponement of an.y election, 
the delay has been brought about by the people 
themselves." 
See also Article ,~~II, Section 9, Constitution of Uta.h, 
and Board of Elections for Franklin County, et al. v. 
State ex rel. Schneider, supra. 
It is stated in American Jurisprudence, Volume 43, 
at page 12 that: 
"* * * It has been declared that a legisla.tive 
extension of the term of an incumbent is virtually 
an appointment of the office for the extended 
time, and is void if the office is one that the legis-
lature may not fill by direct ap·pointment." 
When the legislature provided for holding ove-r of 
the old board members it was either extending terms of 
offices which had been cut off by the constitutional 
amendment, or it was appointing members to new offices. 
Under the cases it was without powe·r to do either. 
PoiNT IV. 
OFFICES ON BOARD OF EDUCATION VACANT. 
As stated in an earlier section of this brief, there 
is a rule of law relied upon by the Attorney General 
to the general effect that when a constitutional amend-
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ment does not point out the time when or the procedure 
by which it is to become effective, its effective date is 
suspended until implementing legislation makes the 
amendment operative. According to those cases, the old 
offices endure for a time unimpaired by the amendment. 
If this be the rule then Bateman, in 1951, still held the 
office to which he was elected, and the old board me;mbers 
the offices to which they were appointed. In such case 
the Attorney General cannot be sustained because the 
board could not displace Bateman in his office, nor ap-
point him to a new office. Such a situation 'vould require 
two offices existing at the same time. 
But the legislature could not seize upon such rule 
even if this court adopted it as the law of this state, and 
for a long and unreasonable time defeat the will of the 
electorate. If the old board members were lawfully held 
over at all it is not because the legislature· has so pro--
vided. Such holding over, if lawful, was by ope·ration of 
law. It is because the effective date. of the amendment 
was suspended pending the enactment of implementing 
legislation. If the legislature could, under the protection 
of such a rule, postpone the time when a full board may 
be elected and qualified until1957, it could postpone the 
election until 1967, and thus successfully defeat the pur-
pose of the amendment. 
In Board of Elections for Franklin County, et al. v. 
State ex rel. Schneider, sup~ra, it is stated that: 
"It is not necessary to cite cases to the effect 
that the inviolability of the right to vote must be 
preserved. The physical act of casting a ballot 
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1neans nothing, but the expression of that ballot 
means everything, and its expression 1nust not be 
defeated, directly or indirectly. * * * 
"In brief, present inctunbents in the office of 
county recorder are given an extra term by the· 
General Assembly. S-uch office·rs are thereby 
given a full term of office without an elector in the 
state having voted for the1n or having been given 
an opportunity to vote for them. Is this not a 
dangerous departure under a republican form of 
government~ If such action on the part of the 
General Assembly were given the· stamp of consti-
tutional approval, then subsequent General As-
semblies could provide for further extensions ad 
infinitum, and the right of the gDiverned to select 
their governors would be nullified." 
See also Snow v. K eddington, supra, wherein this 
court said: 
"The general rule is that the te-rm for which 
an officer is elected shall be fixed before the. elec-
tion. This is founded on the principle that the 
right of selecting officers for fixed terms belongs 
to the people, and the le-gislature is not pe-rmi tte·d 
to defeat this right by changing the length of 
term of office after an officer has been elected. 
"* * * Neithe-r party contends that the voter 
can be denied the right to elect constitutional offi-
cers and to set the term of office. * * *" 
and further on this court says: 
"The authorities generally hold that an act 
which extends the term of office so as to defeat 
the voter's right to elect the officer at the times 
p-rovided in the constitution is unconstitutional." 
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The implementing legislation provides in part, in 
75-7-1, as amended by Chapter 16, First Special Session, 
1951, that: 
"The State Board of Education shall consist 
of nine persons elected by qualified registered 
electors * * * ." 
The legislature thus defined the new board created 
by the Constitution-a new board elective in character 
and substituted for the old appointive board discarded 
and abolished. 
The legislature so far implemented the amendment 
as to define the new board. This, under any view of the 
law, brought the old board to the end of its existence. 
The attempt to defer election of the full board until1956 
was an unconstitutional and unreasonable restraint upon 
the right to vote. Hence it should be ruled that the. offices 
upon the ne·w board are unoccupied and vacant. This is 
not speaking in behalf of confusion and interregnum. 
The members of the new board are state officers, and as 
such the vacancies can and should be filled at once by 
the Governor in the exercise of his constitutional power. 
Mitchell v. Taylor, 43 P. (2d) 803 (Calif.); Askew v. Bas-
sett, 158 S.E. 577 (Ga.) ; State v. Jorgensen, 142 N.W. 4·50 
(N.D.); Waldamer v. Britton, 113 S.W. 1178 (Tenn.); 
Article VII, Seetion 9, Constitution of Utah; McCornick 
v. Thatcher, 8 Utah 294; 30 Pac. 1091. 
The McCornick case just cited deserves special at-
tention. From the decision it appears that the territorial 
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legislature on March 10, 1892, enacted a law which con-
tained the following: 
~~sec. 5. For the Agricultural College of Utah, 
buildings, the sum of $65,000.00; which sum shall 
be expended by and under the- direction of a board 
of construction, to consist of George W. Thatcher, 
Isaac D. Haines and William Goodwin, who shall 
receive for their service the sum of $300.00 to be 
paid upon the completion of said buildings. Said 
board of construction shall each give a bond in the 
sum of $25,000.00, to be approved by the terri-
torial auditor, and qualified by taking the official 
oath before entering upon their duties. Such 
board shall elect a chairman, and warrants for the 
money appropriated for said buildings shall be-
drawn by the auditor of public accounts upon the 
order of such chairman." 
The foregoing language was held to create, identify 
and enumerate the offices upon the board of construction. 
As soon as the act was passed the board came- into ex-
istence·. But that part of the act by which the legislature 
attempted to fill the offices by appointment was held to 
be unlawful as in violation of the· Organic Act. The of-
fices were, therefore, vacant and subject to appointment 
only by the Governor. 
Here the F'irst Special Session of 1951 gave identity, 
body and enumeration to the offices of the newly elected 
school board when it said: 
"75-7-1. Personnel, Number, Appointment, 
Term. 
"The state board of education shall consist of 
nine persons elected by qualified, registered elec-
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tors according to election districts as hereinafter 
provided. * * *" 
The implementation embodied in the foregoing is 
fully as complete as that contained in the statute re-
viewed in the McCornick case. It is observed that the 
McCornick case was decided before statehood, but the 
Organic .Act stood in the place of the state c·onstitution, 
and the parallel between the two decisions is in no wise 
impaired. The vacancies now existing upon the state 
Board of Education should be filled by the Governor in 
accordance with the power and authority enjoined upon 
him by Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution. The 
legislature may then be exp.ected to provide for timely 
election of the members of the Board. 
When the constitutional amendment does not other-
wise provide, it takes effect upon adoption. (See United 
Stat.es of America v. Chambers, et al., supra.) 
The amendment to Article 10, Section 8, was adopted 
on November 5, 1950. If by that adoption the abolishment 
of the old appointive board and the substitution of the 
new board, without defining the number of members 
thereof, became· immediately effective, the legislature 
could neither extend the life of the old board nor appoint 
members to the new one. In such case there was no 
validly subsisting board to appoint a superintendent, nor 
fix his salary. If, on the other hand, the oJd board re-
mained unaffected by the amendment until the amend-
ment was made functional by the legislature, then the 
old board survived until and only until August 15, 1951. 
The surviving old board could not in November, 19'51, 
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appoint Bate1nan as Superintendent. If the old board and 
its officers surYived the an1endn1ent, so did Bateman, 
and the office to 'vhich he was elected. The Attorney 
General states affir1na tively that the office to which 
Bateman "'"as elected 'vas not abolished, and no vacancy 
therein was created. 
Even if the old board survived the amendment for 
a time, it expired "'hen the legislature defined and set up 
. its successor. It might have survived a reasonable time 
longer if the legislature had provided for timely election 
of its successors. In the circumstances the offices upon 
the board were and are vacant from August 15, 1951, and 
should be filled by the Governor pending further lawful 
action of the legislature to give the electorate a timely 
opportunity to vote. McCornick v. Thatcher, sup·ra. 
We invite the court to hold: 
CONCLUSION 
1. That Bateman is still occupying the office to 
which he was elected, and therefore is entitled only to the 
advantages and disadvantages of that office; or, 
2. That Bate·man's office was abolished· and his 
pretended appointment was not made by a validly sub-
sisting or lawfully existing Board o.f Education. 
In either e-vent, plaintiffs are not entitled to the 
relief here prayed for, and the alternative writ here-
tofore issued should be recalled and dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL H. RAY, 
ALBERT R. BOWEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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